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ARGUMENT
I.

FORMER § 10-2-403 (1977) AND CURRENT § 10-2-422 ARE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION WHICH SPECIFICALLY
GOVERN CHALLENGES TO MUNICIPAL ANNEXATIONS

Defendant/appellee Provo City Corporation ("Provo City") appears to concede
that if former Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-403 (1977) and current Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-2-422 are statutes of limitation, they control plaintiff/appellant Richard Davis'
("Davis") challenge to Provo City's 1978 annexation of the real property (the
"Property") Davis now owns. If these statutes are statutes of limitation, they apply
specifically to municipal annexations, and the general "catch all" statute of limitations
in § 78-12-25(3) does not apply.
Provo City argues that former § 10-2-403 and current § 10-2-422, quoted below,
are not statutes of limitation, because of the conclusive presumptive language in these
statutes. However, this argument ignores the fact that the conclusive presumption of
annexation validity arises only after city property taxes against the annexed property
have been levied, assessed and paid,1 and one year has passed, with no challenge to the

l

Provo City points out that both the district court and Davis may have confused the
concepts of property tax levy and property tax assessment, under Utah law. Tax levy
appears to be the fixing of the tax rate. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-5-112(2) and
10-6-133(5). Tax assessment appears to be the tax charge against the owner of the real
property, based upon the levy. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201, et seq. and
59-2-301, et seq. However, a real property owner cannot be expected to pay property
taxes until they are both levied and assessed.
-1-

annexation by the property owner as to whom city property taxes have been levied,
assessed and paid.
The real issue appears to be whether the "conclusive presumption" language of
former § 10-2-403 and current § 10-2-422 turns these statutes of limitation into statutes
of repose. Davis asserts that this language does not have that effect.
While Provo City does not acknowledge that this is the real issue in so many
words, it does so by implication, in citing Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993).
One of the issues Lee addressed was whether certain statutory time limitations for filing
medical malpractice actions were statutes of limitation or statutes of repose.
As noted in Provo City's Brief at p. 12, Lee described statutes of limitation as
follows:
. . . Statutes of limitations are essentially procedural in
nature and establish a prescribed time within which an action
must be filed after it accrues. They do not abolish a
substantive right to sue, but simply provide that if an action
is not filed within the specified time, the remedy is deemed
to have been waived unless the plaintiff did not know of the
facts giving rise to the cause of action. . . . Thus, the
barring of the remedy is caused by a plaintiffs failure to
take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action within the
time afforded by the statute.
867 P.2d at 575 (citation omitted). The Court further explained:
The fixing of a limitations period is highly judgmental and is
determined by the Legislature's weighing a number of
general policies, such as whether particular types of cases
require speedy resolution, the nature of the evidence
-2-

typically used in litigating a particular type of case, the
consequences to putative plaintiffs, defendants, and third
persons who might be affected by the litigation, and the
interest of society at large in not leaving disputes unresolved
for long period of time. Such policy considerations often
suggest different limitations periods for different causes of
action, even as to actions within the same general branch of
the law.
Id. (emphasis added)
In contrast, Lee described statutes of repose as follows:
Unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose abolish a
cause of action after a certain period, even if the action first
accrues after the period has expired. . . . To the extent that
the statute of repose abolishes causes of action that could not
have been sued on within the . . . [statutory] period because
they had not accrued, the statute acts substantively.
Id. at 576 (emphasis added, footnote deleted). The Court then quoted from its prior
decision in Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of America, Inc., 784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989):2
(Sltatutes of repose are . . . not designed, as are statutes of
limitations, to necessarily allow a "reasonable" time in
which to file a lawsuit. A statute of repose might
theoretically cut off a claim filed within the period allowed
by the relevant statute of limitations.
Lee, at 867 P.2d 576, quoting Raithaus at 784 P.2d 1160 (emphasis added).
2

The reason that the statute of limitation vs. statute of repose issue here may be
determinative is because if former § 10-2-403 and present § 10-2-422 are statutes of
repose rather than statutes of limitation, the four year limitation in § 78-12-25(3) might
apply. See, Raithaus, 784 P.2d at 1161-62; Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878
P.2d 1155, 1159 (Utah App. 1994). However, as shown herein, the annexation statutes
at issue here are more like statutes of limitations than statutes of repose, and thus they
control, rather than the general statute of limitations in § 78-12-25(3).
-3-

Legislatures enact statutes of repose, as opposed to statutes
of limitations, for specific reasons . . . . Statutes of repose
. . . are generally enacted to curb rising insurance rates, to
increase the availability of insurance, and to reduce the risk
and uncertainty of liability for manufacturers and those in
the manufacturer's chain of distribution.
Id., quoting Raithausat 784 P.2d 116 (emphasis added).
With respect to the annexation statutes of limitation here, former § 10-2-403
provided:
Whenever the inhabitants of any territory annexed to any
municipality pay property tax levied by the municipality for
one or more years following the annexation and no
inhabitants of the territory protests [sic] the annexation
during the year following the annexation, the territory shall
be conclusively presumed to be properly annexed to the
annexing municipality.
(Emphasis added) Current § 10-2-422 similarly provides:
An area annexed to a municipality under this part shall be
conclusively presumed to have been validly annexed if: (1)
the municipality has levied and the taxpayers within the area
have paid property taxes for more than one year after
annexation; and (2) no resident of the area has contested the
annexation in a court of proper jurisdiction during the year
following annexation.
(Emphasis added)
These statutes are not a model of clarity, and Davis has not been able to find any
legislative history, or any case law (from this or other jurisdictions3), clarifying them.
3

As discussed in Davis1 Opening Brief, Davis relies on State of South Carolina v. City
of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 2000). However, the statute of limitation at issue
-4-

Nevertheless, Davis contends that, when properly interpreted, these statutes are statutes
of limitation rather than statutes of repose, for several reasons.
First, unlike statutes of repose, the Utah annexation statutes of limitation do not
abolish a cause of action to contest an annexation before that cause of action accrues.
The cause of action cannot accrue before the annexation occurs, and these statutes
allow a period of time after the annexation occurs, within which to contest it. Thus,
while the conclusive presumption language may substantively bar the claim if the claim
is not timely filed, it does not do so until after the claim accrues, and the
landowner/inhabitant/taxpayer is given a reasonable opportunity to pursue the claim.
Second, a statute of repose may bar a claim before a plaintiff even knows the
claim exists. See, Lee, supra, at 867 P.2d 576 (noting that a statute of repose may run
before a claim is "known or knowable"). Here, the annexation statutes of limitation do
not begin to run until the property taxes are levied, assessed and paid. The purpose of
this requirement appears to be to make sure the landowner/inhabitant/taxpayer has
notice that the annexation has occurred, and that the municipality is asserting
jurisdiction over the property. This notice is given in the form of a tax assessment,
based on the levy, without which the taxpayer would not be expected to make the tax
payment.

there was somewhat different than the statute of limitation at issue here, although there
are also some similarities, as further discussed below.
-5-

Third, unlike statutes of repose, the annexation statutes of limitation have
nothing to do with " . . . rising insurance rates, . . . the availability of insurance, . . .
[or] the risk and uncertainty of liability for manufacturers and those in the . . . chain of
distribution," as discussed in LeezX. 867 P.2d 576, quoting Raitbaus at 784 P.2d 1161.
Moreover, in the district court, even Provo City characterized the annexation
statutes as "statutefs] of limitations." [Record on Appeal ("R.") 525, 530, 1069, 1793,
1797]. Also, in its Brief, here, at p. 8, Provo City argues: "The function of a statute
of limitations is to establish the time within which suit must be filed" (emphasis in
original) and that " . . . the essential purposes of a statute of limitations are . . . (1) to
prevent the assertion of stale claims against a defendant; and (2) to have claims timely
litigated before evidence is lost, memories fade, or witnesses are unavailable."
Here, the annexation statutes of limitation establish the time within which a
claim to contest a municipal annexation must be filed. The purposes of that time
limitation are to prevent the assertion of a stale claim contesting an annexation and to
make sure such a claim is timely litigated. However, in order to start the running of
the one year statute of limitations, it is necessary that property taxes be levied (and
assessed) against the taxpayer contesting the annexation.4

4

Davis is not, as Provo City suggests, asserting the right to contest the annexation "in
perpetuity" (Provo City Brief, p. 18). Davis does contend, however, that it is
incumbent on the taxing authorities to begin assessing annexed real property if they
want to take advantage of the one year statute.
-6-

In its Brief at p. 17, Provo City concedes that Provo City taxes were never
assessed against Davis1 property, but argues that this omission was not its fault.
However, it was not Davis1 fault either.
Provo City also argues that it is sufficient that municipal property taxes were
assessed against at least some taxpayers in the annexed area. Would it have been
sufficient if only one such taxpayer was assessed? If not, what number or percentage
of affected taxpayers must be assessed? Provo City offers no answers to these
questions.
Provo City also concedes, at p. 6 of its Brief, that despite the fact that the
annexation purportedly occurred in 1978, none of the affected taxpayers were assessed
with municipal property taxes until at least 1981, and one was not assessed until 1985.
However, at p. 17 of its Brief, Provo City argues that even those taxpayers only had
one year after the annexation, i.e., until 1979, within which to protest the annexation.
This argument ignores the purpose of the statutory requirement that levy and
assessment of municipal property taxes are necessary before the one year statute of
limitations commences to run. That purpose is to notify the affected landowners that
the municipality has begun asserting jurisdiction over their properties.5

5

Thus, as to the affected landowners here, to the extent they were assessed Provo City
taxes and did not file an action to contest the annexation within one year after
assessment, they are time barred from doing so.
-7-

At p. 15 of its Brief, Provo City attempts to distinguish State of South Carolina
v. City of Columbia, supra, which held that the specific 90 day statute of limitations
governing annexation protests applied to an action contesting an annexation, rather than
the general, ten year catch all statute of limitations. 528 S.E. 2d at 411-412, 414-415.
Provo City argues that both statutes " . . . were . . . located within the South Carolina
Code's limitation of actions § 5-3-101, et seq." That argument is incorrect.
The South Carolina annexation statute of limitations, S.C. Code Ann. § 5-3-270,
like the Utah annexation statute of limitations, is contained in the statutory chapter
dealing with annexations. The South Carolina catch all statute of limitations, S.C
Code Ann. § 15-3-600, like the Utah catch all statute of limitations, is contained in the
statutory chapter dealing with statutes of limitation.
Provo City also argues that the South Carolina annexation statute of limitations
does not establish a conclusive presumption of the validity of an annexation. The South
Carolina statute provides as follows:
§ 5-3-270. Time within which contest on extension of
municipal limits must be instituted.
When the limits of a municipality are ordered extended, no
contest thereabout shall be allowed unless the person
interested therein files, within sixty days after the result has
been published or declared, with both the clerk of the
municipality and the clerk of court of the county in which
the municipality is located, a notice of his intention to
contest the extension, nor unless, within ninety days from
the time the result has been published or declared an action
-8-

is begun and the original summons and complaint filed with
the clerk of court of the county in which the municipality is
located.
(Emphasis added)
While this statute does not contain the conclusive presumption language
contained in the Utah statute, it does provide that unless proceedings to contest an
annexation are timely instituted, "no contest thereabout shall be allowed." Moreover,
failure to timely institute such proceedings are an "absolute bar" to an action contesting
an annexation. See, Moon v. City of Greer, 558 S.E.2d 527, 531 (S.C. App. 2002).
Nevertheless, in State of South Carolina v. City of Columbia, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that this specific time limitation for actions contesting a municipal
annexation controlled, rather than the general, catch all statute of limitations. This
Court should rule the same way here, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 and Quick
Safe-THitch v. RSBSystemsL.C.,

2000 UT 84, \ 15, 12 P.3d 577, as argued in

Davis' Opening Brief.
II.

THE OTHER TWO ISSUES PROVO CITY RAISES ARE NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT

Provo City also argues that, regardless of which statute applies, Provo City fully
or substantially complied with the Utah annexation statutes, and that Davis or his
predecessors waited an unreasonable length of time before contesting the annexation of

-9-

the property Davis now owns. However, these two issues are not properly before this
Court, and the Court may not consider them.
The only issue raised by Davis1 Petition for Permission to Appeal from
Interlocutory Order is which statute of limitations applies to his challenge to Provo
City's annexation of the property he now owns. More importantly, the district court
has never ruled upon either of the two issues Provo City attempts to raise on this
interlocutory appeal.
The issue of whether Provo City fully or substantially complied with the Utah
annexation statutes goes to the merits of Davis1 Seventh Cause of Action. The district
court never reached the merits of that claim, because of its ruling on the statute of
limitations issue. Although Provo City also argued in the district court that Davis
unreasonably delayed bringing his Seventh Cause of Action (R. 527-528), the district
court also did not address that issue, again because of its ruling on the applicable statute
of limitations.
It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not consider issues that have not yet
been addressed by the lower court. See, Utah R. App. P. 5 (allowing discretionary
appeals only from interlocutory orders). Without a ruling from the lower court, there
is nothing from which an appeal can even be taken.
Moreover, because the above two issues were not raised in Davis' Petition for
Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order, they are not properly before this Court
-10-

for that reason as well. See, Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1333
(7th Cir. 1977), cert, den., 434 U.S. 975 (1977) (declining to consider issue raised in
discretionary interlocutory appeal where, among other things, ". . . appellants did not
include it in the grounds supporting their petition for leave to appeal to this court.")
Thus, Davis does not intend to address the merits of the two issues that Provo City now
raises, but that have not yet been addressed by the district court, and are not the subject
of this interlocutory appeal.6
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and as argued in Davis1 Opening Brief, this Court
should reverse the district court's September 20, 2006 Order, and rule that the
applicable statutes of limitation are former § 10-2-403 (1977) and current § 10-2-422,
not § 78-12-25(3).

6

In the event that, for whatever reason, this Court decides to address these issues, Davis
requests leave to file a supplemental brief addressing their merits. Also, in this appeal,
both Davis and Provo City have argued over whether, assuming former § 10-2-403 and
present § 10-2-422 are the applicable statutes of limitation, these statutes have run as to
Davis1 Seventh Cause of Action. Because the district court has also not yet ruled on
this issue either, due to its ruling that § 78-12-25(3) is the applicable statute of
limitations, if this Court rules that the annexation statutes of limitation are the
applicable ones, it should probably also remand to the district court for a ruling on
whether these statutes have run, rather than further addressing this issue without a
ruling on it from the district court.
-11-
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